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1 Introduction
Strategic trade policy has been one of the most intensively researched areas of international trade
over the last three decades following the path-breaking seminal work by Brander and Spencer (1985).
In their work, both governments adopt trade polices to confer strategic advantage to their respective
domestic firm when firms are imperfectly competing with each other. The essence of this literature
explains how these strategic trade policies are beneficial at the national level. Further research along
this line examines a wide variety of alternative scenarios which involves (but not limited to): the nature
of oligopolistic competition in terms of conjectural variation and conduct parameters, available trade
policy instruments, information structure, timing and leadership structure, etc.1
Most early papers along this line of research in strategic trade policy adopt the third-market setting:
the entire output of the rival oligopolistic firms are exported to a market other than the one where firms
themselves are located. These papers exclusively focus on how governments can shift oligopoly rents by
using export subsidy in favor of their respective domestic firms. (e.g., see Cooper and Riezman (1989),
Shivakumar (1993) and Caglayan (2000)). On the other hand, in the so-called reciprocal market model,
first analyzed by Brander and Krugman (1983), domestic and foreign firms are assumed to compete
in each other’s market. The typical case, where firms engage in Cournot competition in homogeneous
product gives rise to intra-industry trade of reciprocal dumping variety. An implication of this setting
for strategic trade policy is that consumer’s surplus becomes significantly important in determining
social welfare for governments. Brander and Spencer (1985) and Dixit (1984) are the pioneering
papers that analyze equilibrium in strategic trade policy in the deterministic reciprocal market.In
the reciprocal dumping model, import restriction becomes an additional viable policy regime. Nash
equilibrium levels of subsidy game and tariff game usually involves positive subsidy and tariff rate.
However, the welfare ranking of the policy regimes is generally ambiguous.
Although the so-called third market model is a useful simplification for isolating rent-shifting mo-
tive for strategic trade policy, reciprocal dumping model is apparently the more realistic scenario.
Important policy issues such as export subsidies and countervailing duties can only be analyzed in the
reciprocal dumping model. However, a limitation of the literature to date is that policy making in
reciprocal market is analyzed with no uncertainty. Most recently, Anam and Chiang (2018) extend
Cooper and Riezman (1989) strategic trade policy in reciprocal markets that are interdependent, and
they replace the constant marginal cost assumption with quadratic cost functions. They show that
1For a complete survey of these early literature incorporating extensions in strategic trade policy, see Brander (1995).
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quadratic cost functional form has significant impact on the sign of export subsidy, and the market
correlation plays an important role in determining Nash equilibrium in choosing optimal policy regime.
Unlike Anam and Chiang (2018), this paper retains basic assumption of constant marginal cost and
segmented markets, but the added value of this paper is to introduce incomplete information at indus-
trial level.2 In order to highlight the impact of uncertainty, the simplest framework for the reciprocal
market is assumed. There is one firm in the home and foreign countries producing a homogeneous
good at constant marginal cost. The firms compete in both markets as Cournot duopolists, similar to
Brander (1981). The two markets are segmented, and in one market demand is deterministic while in
the other demand is stochastic .In stage one, both governments are assumed to simultaneously commit
to either a tariff or an export subsidy policy before the resolution of uncertainty. In stage two, the
level of each policy instrument is set again before random variable is revealed. In order to highlight
the role of incomplete information at industrial level, we discuss two possible information partition:
(i) both firms are able to observe the realized demand and (ii) only the domestic firm can observe true
state of nature. The true market demand is revealed according to different information partition at
the beginning of stage three. Finally, in stage three, the firms set their profit-maximizing output in
both markets taking the present strategic trade policy level as given. As in the conventional analysis,
both governments arrive at the Nash strategic trade policy equilibrium by backward induction. An
important feature of this setup (in both information partition cases) is that governments and the firms
stand to capture option value associated with the ability to make strategic decisions after the resolution
of uncertainty.
We construct a game in which each government chooses the policy regime between tariffs and export
subsidies in stage one. This gives rise to four possible scenarios: subsidy v.s. subsidy (S, S), tariff v.s.
tariff (T, T ), tariff v.s. subsidy (T, S) and subsidy v.s. tariff (S, T ). The Bayesian Nash equilibrium
levels of each policy is determined in stage two. The firms (one domestic and the other foreign)
then compete against each other. The multi-stage game is then solved by backward induction. Two
different information partitions (complete information and incomplete information at industrial level)
are considered for each pair of strategies. National welfare associated with each policy combination is
then used to characterize the choice of policy regimes.
2Ning (2020a) extends Cooper and Riezman (1989) by incorporating incomplete information at industrial level in
a third market model. He shows that flexibility is no longer desirable when one firm has more information about the
third market than the other firm, and thus export quota becomes a strictly dominant strategy for the country with
less informed firm. On the other hand, Ning (2020b) introduces incomplete information at industrial level in examining
social welfare equivalence issue of tariff and quota from the importing country’s perspective. He shows that a tariff is
always superior to a quota as long as incomplete information persists at industrial level.
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Several interesting results emerge from our analysis. We show that Nash equilibrium export sub-
sidy dominates the corresponding tariff equilibrium for both information partitions. Our analysis
demonstrates that incomplete information at industrial level redistributes the option value associated
with better information.Incomplete information is shown to shift option value to the country with the
more informed firm. As in the optimal strategic choice of trade policy games, we show that (T, T ) is
the unique Nash equilibrium policy combination for both trade games with complete and incomplete
information. Moreover, the trade games with complete and incomplete information have a prisoner
dilemma property since (S, S) is a Pareto the outcome. Furthermore, we also show that the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium outcome is inferior to the outcome without any government interventions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic reciprocal dumping model. Section
3 derives the sub-game equilibrium for the trade game with incomplete information and that under
complete information. Section 4 characterizes and analyzes the optimal choice of policy regimes.
Section 5 relates our results to free-trade outcome. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a two-country (home and foreign) model in which each country has only one firm producing
a homogeneous good. These firms are identical except for their country of operation if there is no
government intervention. For computational as well as expositional ease, we assume that the demand
function in each country is linear with constant slope b. In order to highlight the effect of incom-
plete information, we assume the demand in country 1 is uncertain, but the demand in country 2 is
deterministic. Thus, the inverse demand functions for countries 1 and 2 are given by
p1 = a− b (q1 + x2) + ε,
and
p2 = a− b (q2 + x1) ,
where pi is the commodity price in country i, qi is the delivery of the local firm to the local market,
xj is the export of firm j to market i, and ε is a random disturbance term in the domestic market
demand for all i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Following the convention, country 1 is the home country and
country 2 the foreign country.
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For simplicity, we assume the random variable ε is binary. Specifically,
ε ∈ Ω ≡ {−V, V } ,
where V ∈ R. The subjective common prior probability measure over Ω is assumed to be (θ, 1− θ). In
other words, we assume that the bad state −V occurs with probability θ and the good state V occurs
with probability 1− θ, respectively.
Assume each firm produces final goods at a constant marginal cost of c > 0. The cost function for
firm i is therefore assumed to be
Ci = c (qi + xi) ,
for i = 1, 2. Homogeneous product with identical cost structure implies that the trade is entirely of
the intra-industry type.
Following Anam and Chiang (2018), our trade game consists of three stages. In stage one, each
government commits to a policy instrument to be either export subsidy or tariff. The corresponding
levels of the policy regimes are then set in stage two once the specific trade policy is prescribed in
the previous stage. At the beginning of stage three, the random variable ε is either revealed to both
firms (trade game of complete information) or only to the domestic firm (trade game of incomplete
information). Both firms then play a Cournot game by setting outputs (both for local and foreign
delivery) to maximize their profits, given the optimal policies chosen by the governments in previous
stages. To ease presentation, the equilibrium analysis for stage sub-game under complete information
is relegated to the Appendix. In the main text, we exclusively focus our analysis on the stage game
under incomplete information.
Figure 1 shows the timing of uncertainty resolution for the trade game under incomplete informa-
tion. Note that the random variable ε is realized at the beginning of stage three. The random variable,
once realized, is only observed by firm 1. Given that the better informed firm would stand to capture
option values at the expense of the less informed firm, the implication that comes out of the game
under incomplete information is expected to be substantially different from that under perfect infor-
mation. Since the random variable becomes known at the beginning of stage three, both governments
make their policy choices without having any knowledge of true demand in the home market.
Our model differs from Anam and Chiang (2018) in three ways: Firstly, in their model, the cost
function for each firm is assumed to be quadratic. The increasing marginal cost in their model has
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Figure 1: Timing of Three-Stage Trade Game with Incomplete Information
Stage 1 Stage 2 Beginning of Stage 3 Stage 3
Both governments Both governments Only Firms
select → select → firm 1 → play
policy modes policy levels observes ε Cournot game
significant impact on the levels of trade policies.3 In our model, however, the market equilibrium
is separable given segmented markets and constant marginal costs in order to highlight the role of
information. Secondly, they assume identical market demand in both countries while we assume
asymmetric market demand. Lastly, they only consider the complete information trade game while we
also conduct equilibrium analysis for incomplete information at industrial level.
Without loss of generality, we assume θ = 12 in the subsequent analysis. Given this, the expected
value of random variable is E (ε) = 0, and its variance is V ar (ε) = σ2 = V 2. This simplified
assumption allows us to see clearly the effect of market volatility on the choice of policy regime.
In what follows, we derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for various policy regimes by backward
induction, beginning with stage three.
3 Subgame Equilibrium
In this section, we derive equilibrium output levels for both firms in stage three for trade game with
incomplete information under various trade policies. The expected social welfare level for both govern-
ments is then calculated by reverting back to previous stages given that both governments anticipate
equilibrium output levels in the last stage. We use Bayesian Nash solution concept in solving equilib-
rium output levels for trade game with incomplete information. The complete derivation of subgame
equilibrium for trade game with complete information at industrial level can be found in the Appendix.
We use superscript CI to denote variable choices for trade game with complete information, and we
use superscript II to denote variable choices for trade game with incomplete information. We also use
(a1, a2) to denote pair of strategies each government chooses in the first stage, where ai ∈ Ai ≡ {S, T}
for i = 1, 2.4
Next, we examine the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for our three-stage game for four policy combi-
nations: (S, S), (T, T ), (T, S), and (S, T ).
3Specifically, quadratic cost function can make optimal export subsidy level negative.
4For example, (S, T ) represents that government 1 chooses export subsidy and government 2 imposes tariff.
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3.1 Subsidy Game (S,S)
We start with the subsidy game in which both governments choose to the amount of export subsidy
for their firms in the first stage. The domestic firm, being able to observe the true demand in market
1, solves the following maximization problem:
max
qII
1L
(S,S),xII
1
(S,S)
piII1L (S, S) =
(
a− b
(
qII1L (S, S) + x
II
2 (S, S)
)
− V
)
qII1L (S, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qII2 (S, S) + x
II
1 (S, S)
))
xII1 (S, S)
− c
(
qII1L (S, S) + x
II
1 (S, S)
)
+ s1x
II
1 (S, S) , (1)
if ε = −V and
max
qII
1H
(S,S),xII
1
(S,S)
piII1H (S, S) =
(
a− b
(
qII1H (S, S) + x
II
2 (S, S)
)
+ V
)
qII1H (S, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qII2 (S, S) + x
II
1 (S, S)
))
xII1 (S, S)
− c
(
qII1H (S, S) + x
II
1 (S, S)
)
+ s1x
II
1 (S, S) , (2)
if ε = V , where s1 is the subsidy granted by government 1. Nevertheless, the foreign firm, being unable
to observe the true state of nature in market 1, solves the following maximization problem:
max
qII
2
(S,S),xII
2
(S,S)
E
(
piII2 (S, S)
)
=
(
a− b
(
qII2 (S, S) + x
II
1 (S, S)
))
qII2 (S, S)
+
1
2
∑
ε∈Ω
(
a− b
(
qII1 (S, S) + x
II
2 (S, S)
)
+ ε
)
xII2 (S, S)
− c
(
qII2 (S, S) + x
II
2 (S, S)
)
+ s2x
II
2 (S, S) , (3)
where qII1 (S, S) ∈
{
qII1L (S, S) , q
II
1H (S, S)
}
depends on the realization of ε and s2 is the subsidy given
by the foreign government. The best response functions for above optimization problems are
BR1L = q
II
1L (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1L (S, S) ,
BR1H = q
II
1H (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1H (S, S) ,
BR1x = x
II
1 (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1L (S, S) ,
BR2 = q
II
2 (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
II
2 (S, S) ,
BR2x = x
II
2 (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
II
2 (S, S) .
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Solving these equations simultaneously yields Bayesian Nash equilibrium points for stage three
game given any (s1, s2, V ):
qII1L (S, S) =
1
6b
(2 (a− c)− 3V − 2s2) ,
qII1H (S, S) =
1
6b
(2 (a− c) + 3V − 2s2) ,
xII1 (S, S) =
1
3b
(a− c+ 2s1) ,
qII2 (S, S) =
1
3b
(a− c− s1) ,
xII2 (S, S) =
1
3b
(a− c+ 2s2) .
It is evident that a higher export subsidy provided by the domestic government increases the export
of the domestic firm to the foreign market, but a higher export subsidy given by the foreign government
to its own firm lowers the local delivery of the domestic firm to the domestic market. This is due to
profit shifting as noted in Brander and Spencer (1985).
Folding back to the second stage, both governments then set subsidy rates to maximize their
respective social welfare function, given that they anticipate the Bayesian Nash equilibrium output
level in the subsequent stage. The social welfare functions for both governments under the subsidy
game are the sum of producer’s surplus and consumer’s surplus net of total subsidy, given by
max
s1
E
(
SW II1 (S, S)
)
= PSII1 (S, S) + CS
II
1 (S, S)− S
II
1 (S, S)
=
1
2
(
piII1L (S, S) + pi
II
1H (S, S)
)
+
1
2
(
b
2
(
qII1L (S, S) + x
II
2 (S, S)
)2
+
b
2
(
qII1H (S, S) + x
II
2 (S, S)
)2)
− s1x
II
1 (S, S) , (4)
max
s2
E
(
SW II2 (S, S)
)
= PSII2 (S, S) + CS
II
2 (S, S)− S
II
2 (S, S)
= piII2 (S, S) +
b
2
(qII2 (S, S) + x
II
1 (S, S))
2 − s2x
II
2 (S, S) . (5)
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The best response functions of stage-two game are
BR1 (s2) = s1 ∈ argmaxE
(
SW II1 (S, S)
)
,
BR2 (s1) = s2 ∈ argmaxE
(
SW II2 (S, S)
)
.
Solving yields Bayesian Nash equilibrium level of export subsidies
s∗1 = s
∗
2 =
1
4
(a− c) . (6)
Clearly, the expected level of Bayesian Nash equilibrium subsidy is the same for both countries
mainly because both governments make their policy choices on the basis of the distribution of ε. With
no surprise, these optimal subsidy rates are identical to the solution under perfect information (see
equation (45) in Appendix A).
By substitution, we can obtain the expected output levels as follows:
E
(
qII1L (S, S)
)
=
1
4b
(a− c)−
1
2b
V,
E
(
qII1H (S, S)
)
=
1
4b
(a− c) +
1
2b
V,
E
(
xII1 (S, S)
)
=
1
2b
(a− c) ,
E
(
qII2 (S, S)
)
=
1
4b
(a− c) ,
E
(
xII2 (S, S)
)
=
1
2b
(a− c) .
Now we are able to compare these output levels for the subsidy game under incomplete information
with the output levels under complete information. Note that E
(
xII2 (S, S)
)
is the weighted average of
E
(
xCI2L (S, S)
)
and E
(
xCI2H (S, S)
)
5, given our assumption that each state occurs with equal probability.
Without being able to observe the true market demand in the domestic country, the foreign firm
now can only supply a state-independent export to the domestic market. As a consequence, the
domestic firm tends to deliver lower (higher) local output in low (high) market demand compare to the
complete information case under subsidy game. This can be seen as E
(
qII1L (S, S)
)
< E
(
qCI1L (S, S)
)
and E
(
qII1H (S, S)
)
> E
(
qCI1H (S, S)
)
. Since the foreign market involves no uncertainty, there is no
change in the foreign firm’s local delivery and the domestic firm’s export to the foreign market.
5See Appendix A for expected output levels under subsidy game with complete information.
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Given optimal subsidy levels with incomplete information, the expected social welfare for both
countries under subsidy game with incomplete information are
E
(
SW II1 (S, S)
)
=
15
32b
(a− c)
2
+
3
8b
σ2, (7)
E
(
SW II2 (S, S)
)
=
15
32b
(a− c)
2
. (8)
It is worth noting that now the expected social welfare for the foreign country contains no term
associated with option value. The incomplete information at industrial level shifts the entire option
value to the domestic country. As the domestic firm is able to make output decisions after it observes
the random variable, incomplete information for the foreign firm enables the domestic firm to fully
capture the option value. As a result, the domestic country ends up with higher expected social welfare
relative to the foreign country due to option value effects. This can be seen from E
(
SW II1 (S, S)
)
−
E
(
SW II2 (S, S)
)
= 38bσ
2. Moreover, it can be easily verified that
∂E(SW II1 (S,S))
∂σ2
> 0.6 This gives us
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For export subsidy game with incomplete information at industrial level,
i. the entire option value shifts to the domestic country due to incomplete information against the
foreign firm;
ii. social welfare for the domestic country increases as variance increases;
iii. the domestic country ends up with higher social welfare due to option value effects.
Next, we turn to examine sub game equilibrium with incomplete information under tariffs.
3.2 Tariff Game (T,T)
Under tariffs, the domestic firm solves the following maximization problem:
max
qII
1L
(T,T ),xII
1
(T,T )
piII1L (T, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qII1L (T, T ) + x
II
2 (T, T )
)
− V
)
qII1L (T, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qII2 (T, T ) + x
II
1 (T, T )
))
xII1 (T, T )
− c
(
qII1L (T, T ) + x
II
1 (T, T )
)
− t2x
II
1 (T, T ) , (9)
6A similar result obtained by Cooper and Riezman (1989), Chen and Hwang (2006) and Anam and Chiang (2018).
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if ε = −V and
max
qII
1H
(T,T ),xII
1
(T,T )
piII1H (T, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qII1H (T, T ) + x
II
2 (T, T )
)
+ V
)
qII1H (T, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qII2 (T, T ) + x
II
1 (T, T )
))
xII1 (T, T )
− c
(
qII1H (T, T ) + x
II
1 (T, T )
)
− t2x
II
1 (T, T ) , (10)
if ε = V , where t2 is the tariff imposed by the foreign government on exports from the domestic firm.
On the contrary, the foreign firm maximizes the expected profit function given a common prior:
max
qII
2
(T,T ),xII
2
(T,T )
E
(
piII2 (T, T )
)
=
(
a− b
(
qII2 (T, T ) + x
II
1 (T, T )
))
qII2 (T, T )
+
1
2
∑
ε∈Ω
(
a− b
(
qII1 (T, T ) + x
II
2 (T, T )
)
+ ε
)
xII2 (T, T )
− c
(
qII2 (T, T ) + x
II
2 (T, T )
)
− t1x
II
2 (T, T ) , (11)
where qII1 (T, T ) ∈
{
qII1L (T, T ) , q
II
1H (T, T )
}
depend on the realization of ε, and t1 is the tariff imposed
by the domestic government on exports from the foreign firm. The corresponding best response
functions for above maximization problems are
BR1L = q
II
1L (T, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1L (T, T ) ,
BR1H = q
II
1H (T, T ) ,∈ argmaxpi
II
1H (T, T ) ,
BR1x = x
II
1 (T, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1L (T, T ) ,
BR2 = q
II
2 (T, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
II
2 (T, T ) ,
BR2x = x
II
2 (T, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
II
2 (T, T ) .
Solving yields Bayesian Nash equilibrium output levels given any (t1, t2, V ):
qII1L (T, T ) =
1
6b
(2 (a− c)− 3V + 2t1) ,
qII1H (T, T ) =
1
6b
(2 (a− c) + 3V + 2t1) ,
xII1 (T, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c− 2t2) ,
qII2 (T, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c+ t2) ,
xII2 (T, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c− 2t1) .
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Going backward to the second stage, each government chooses a tariff rate ti to maximize its
expected social welfare given that each government anticipates firms’ strategic behavior in the last
stage. The expected social welfare for each government is specified as the sum of producer’s sur-
plus, consumer’s surplus, and tariff revenue. Given the common prior assumption, we can write each
government’s problem as
max
t1
E
(
SW II1 (T, T )
)
= PSII1 (T, T ) + CS
II
1 (T, T ) + TR
II
1 (T, T )
=
1
2
(
piII1L (T, T ) + pi
II
1H (T, T )
)
+
1
2
(
b
2
(
qII1L (T, T ) + x
II
2 (T, T )
)2
+
b
2
(
qII1H (T, T ) + x
II
2 (T, T )
)2)
+ t1x
II
2 (T, T ) , (12)
max
t2
E
(
SW II2 (T, T )
)
= PSII2 (T, T ) + CS
II
2 (T, T ) + TR
II
2 (T, T )
= piII2 (T, T ) +
b
2
(qII2 (T, T ) + x
II
1 (T, T ))
2 + t2x
II
1 (T, T ) . (13)
The best response functions for stage two game are
BR1 (t2) = t1 ∈ argmaxE
(
SW II1 (T, T )
)
,
BR2 (t1) = t2 ∈ argmaxE
(
SW II2 (T, T )
)
.
Hence the Bayesian Nash equilibrium policy rates are
t∗1 = t
∗
2 =
1
3
(a− c) . (14)
The optimal tariff rates set by the governments are the same under incomplete information. They
are again identical to that under complete information (see Appendix B) due to no change in informa-
tion partition at the national level. Given these optimal tariff rates, we can get the expected output
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levels in stage three as follows:
E
(
qII1L (T, T )
)
=
4
9b
(a− c)−
1
2b
V,
E
(
qII1H (T, T )
)
=
4
9b
(a− c) +
1
2b
V,
E
(
xII1 (T, T )
)
=
1
9b
(a− c) ,
E
(
qII2 (T, T )
)
=
4
9b
(a− c) ,
E
(
xII2 (T, T )
)
=
1
9b
(a− c) .
Similar to the argument we made for subsidy game under incomplete information, the well-informed
firm is more aggressive (conservative) in the good (bad) market 1, and the ill-informed firm tends to
deliver a state-independent export to the market 1. This is due to the effect of incomplete information
at the industrial level. Given the optimal tariff rates, we can calculate the expected social welfare for
each country as
E
(
SW II1 (T, T )
)
=
65
162b
(a− c)
2
+
3
8b
σ2, (15)
E
(
SW II2 (T, T )
)
=
65
162b
(a− c)
2
. (16)
As we can see, the option value associated with better information now completely shifts to the
domestic country under tariffs when the domestic firm is a information monopolist. One can also easily
verify that
∂E(SW II1 (T,T ))
∂σ2
> 0. The above can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For tariff game under incomplete information,
i. the entire option value shifts to the domestic country due to the information deficiency of the
foreign firm;
ii. social welfare for the domestic country increases as variance increases;
iii. the domestic country ends up with higher social welfare due to option value effects.
Next, we examine equilibrium points under mixed games with incomplete information.
3.3 Mixed Game (T,S)
For the mixed game, we first analyze the sub-game equilibrium when the domestic government imposes
tariff on the goods imported to market 1 and the foreign government subsidizes firm 2’s export.
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In stage three, the maximization problems for the domestic firm are
max
qII
1L
(T,S),xII
1
(T,S)
piII1L (T, S) =
(
a− b
(
qII1L (T, S) + x
II
2 (T, S)
)
− V
)
qII1L (T, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qII2 (T, S) + x
II
1 (T, S)
))
xII1 (T, S)
− c
(
qII1L (T, S) + x
II
1 (T, S)
)
, (17)
if ε = −V and
max
qII
1H
(T,S),xII
1
(T,S)
piII1H (T, S) =
(
a− b
(
qII1H (T, S) + x
II
2 (T, S)
)
+ V
)
qII1H (T, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qII2 (T, S) + x
II
1 (T, S)
))
xII1 (T, S)
− c
(
qII1H (T, S) + x
II
1 (T, S)
)
, (18)
if ε = V . The ill-informed foreign firm solves the following maximization problem, given a common
prior:
max
qII
2
(T,S),xII
2
(T,S)
E
(
piII2 (T, S)
)
=
(
a− b
(
qII2 (T, S) + x
II
1 (T, S)
))
qII2 (T, S)
+
1
2
∑
ε∈Ω
(
a− b
(
qII1 (T, S) + x
II
2 (T, S)
)
+ ε
)
xII2 (T, S)
− c
(
qII2 (T, S) + x
II
2 (T, S)
)
− t1x
II
2 (T, S) + s2x
II
2 (T, S) , (19)
where qII1 (T, S) ∈
{
qII1L (T, S) , q
II
1H (T, S)
}
depend on the realization of ε, t1 is the tariff imposed by
government 1 and s2 is the export subsidy provided by government 2.
The corresponding best response functions for the stage three game are
BR1L = q
II
1L (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1L (T, S) ,
BR1H = q
II
1H (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1H (T, S) ,
BR1x = x
II
1 (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1L (T, S) ,
BR2 = q
II
2 (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
II
2 (T, S) ,
BR2x = x
II
2 (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
II
2 (T, S) .
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Solving yields Bayesian Nash equilibrium points for stage three game given any (t1, s2, V ):
qII1L (T, S) =
1
6b
(2 (a− c)− 3V − 2s2 + 2t1) ,
qII1H (T, S) =
1
6b
(2 (a− c) + 3V − 2s2 + 2t1) ,
xII1 (T, S) =
1
3b
(a− c) ,
qII2 (T, S) =
1
3b
(a− c) ,
xII2 (T, S) =
1
3b
(a− c+ 2s2 − 2t1) .
In stage two, the domestic government chooses tariff rate and the foreign government chooses
subsidy rate in order to maximize their expected social welfare given that both governments anticipate
that firms behave strategically. The expected social welfare for the domestic country is the sum of
producer’s surplus, consumer’s surplus, and tariff revenue, while the expected social welfare for the
foreign country is the sum of producer’s surplus and consumer’s surplus net of total subsidy. Formally,
we have
max
t1
E
(
SW II1 (T, S)
)
= PSII1 (T, S) + CS
II
1 (T, S) + TR
II
1 (T, S)
=
1
2
(
piII1L (T, S) + pi
II
1H (T, S)
)
+
1
2
(
b
2
(
qII1L (T, S) + x
II
2 (T, S)
)2
+
b
2
(
qII1H (T, S) + x
II
2 (T, S)
)2)
+ t1x
II
2 (T, S) , (20)
max
s2
E
(
SW II2 (T, S)
)
= PSII2 (T, S) + CS
II
2 (T, S)− S
II
2 (T, S)
= piII2 (T, S) +
b
2
(qII2 (T, S) + x
II
1 (T, S))
2 − s2x
II
2 (T, S) . (21)
The corresponding best response functions are
BR1 (s2) = t1 ∈ argmaxE
(
SW II1 (T, S)
)
,
BR2 (t1) = s2 ∈ argmaxE
(
SW II2 (T, S)
)
.
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Solving stage two game gives us the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium policy rates:
t∗1 =
5
14
(a− c) , (22)
s∗2 =
1
14
(a− c) . (23)
Note that these optimal policy rates are identical to the mixed game with complete information.7
Given these, the expected output in stage three can be summarized as follows:
E
(
qII1L (T, S)
)
=
3
7b
(a− c)−
1
2b
V,
E
(
qII1H (T, S)
)
=
3
7b
(a− c) +
1
2b
V,
E
(
xII1 (T, S)
)
=
1
3b
(a− c) ,
E
(
qII2 (T, S)
)
=
1
3b
(a− c) ,
E
(
xII2 (T, S)
)
=
1
7b
(a− c) .
The corresponding expected social welfare functions are
E
(
SW II1 (T, S)
)
=
449
882b
(a− c)
2
+
3
8b
σ2, (24)
E
(
SW II2 (T, S)
)
=
101
294b
(a− c)
2
. (25)
Obviously, that the expected social welfare for the domestic country increases with market volatility.
3.4 Mixed Game (S,T)
In this case, the domestic government subsidizes firm 1’s exports to the foreign market, while the
foreign government imposes tariff on the imports from firm 1.
7Optimal rates for complete information can be found in Appendix C. The same reasoning in previous sections is also
applied here.
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As above, the problems for the domestic firm is
max
qII
1L
(S,T ),xII
1
(S,T )
piII1L (S, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qII1L (S, T ) + x
II
2 (S, T )
)
− V
)
qII1L (S, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qII2 (S, T ) + x
II
1 (S, T )
))
xII1 (S, T )
− c
(
qII1L (S, T ) + x
II
1 (S, T )
)
− t2x
II
1 (S, T ) + s1x
II
1 (S, T ) , (26)
if ε = −V and
max
qII
1H
(S,T ),xII
1
(S,T )
piII1H (S, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qII1H (S, T ) + x
II
2 (S, T )
)
+ V
)
qII1H (S, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qII2 (S, T ) + x
II
1 (S, T )
))
xII1 (S, T )
− c
(
qII1H (S, T ) + x
II
1 (S, T )
)
− t2x
II
1 (S, T ) + s1x
II
1 (S, T ) ,
if ε = V , where t2 is the tariff imposed by the foreign government and s1 is the export subsidy given
by the domestic government.
The foreign firm solves the following maximization problem, given a common prior
max
qII
2
(S,T ),xII
2
(S,T )
E
(
piII2 (S, T )
)
=
(
a− b
(
qII2 (S, T ) + x
II
1 (S, T )
))
qII2 (S, T )
+
1
2
∑
ε∈Ω
(
a− b
(
qII1 (S, T ) + x
II
2 (S, T )
)
+ ε
)
xII2 (S, T )
− c
(
qII2 (S, T ) + x
II
2 (S, T )
)
, (27)
where qII1 (S, T ) ∈
{
qII1L (S, T ) , q
II
1H (S, T )
}
depend on the realization of ε.
The best response functions for stage three game are
BR1L = q
II
1L (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1L (S, T ) ,
BR1H = q
II
1H (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1H (S, T ) ,
BR1x = x
II
1 (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
II
1L (S, T ) ,
BR2 = q
II
2 (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
II
2 (S, T ) ,
BR2x = x
II
2 (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
II
2 (S, T ) .
16
Solving yields the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium points for stage three game given any (s1, t2, V ):
qII1L (S, T ) =
1
6b
(2 (a− c)− 3V ) ,
qII1H (S, T ) =
1
6b
(2 (a− c) + 3V ) ,
xII1 (S, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c+ 2s1 − 2t2) ,
qII2 (S, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c− s1 + t2) ,
xII2 (S, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c) .
In stage two, the domestic government chooses subsidy rate and the foreign government chooses
tariff rate to maximize their expected social welfare:
max
s1
E
(
SW II1 (S, T )
)
= PSII1 (S, T ) + CS
II
1 (S, T )− S
II
1 (S, T )
=
1
2
(
piII1L (S, T ) + pi
II
1H (S, T )
)
+
1
2
(
b
2
(
qII1L (S, T ) + x
II
2 (S, T )
)2
+
b
2
(
qII1H (S, T ) + x
II
2 (S, T )
)2)
− s1x
II
1 (S, T ) , (28)
max
t2
E
(
SW II2 (S, T )
)
= PSII2 (S, T ) + CS
II
2 (S, T ) + TR
II
2 (S, T )
= piII2 (S, T ) +
b
2
(qII2 (S, T ) + x
II
1 (S, T ))
2 + t2x
II
1 (S, T ) . (29)
The corresponding best response functions for stage two game are
BR1 (t2) = s1 ∈ argmaxE
(
SW II1 (S, T )
)
,
BR2 (s1) = t2 ∈ argmaxE
(
SW II2 (S, T )
)
.
Solving yields Bayesian Nash equilibrium level of policy rates:
s∗1 =
1
14
(a− c) , (30)
t∗2 =
5
14
(a− c) . (31)
Given these optimal policy rates, we can then calculate the expected output decisions by firms in
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the last stage:
E
(
qII1L (S, T )
)
=
1
3b
(a− c)−
1
2b
V,
E
(
qII1H (S, T )
)
=
1
3b
(a− c) +
1
2b
V,
E
(
xII1 (S, T )
)
=
1
7b
(a− c) ,
E
(
qII2 (S, T )
)
=
3
7b
(a− c) ,
E
(
xII2 (S, T )
)
=
1
3b
(a− c) .
The corresponding expected social welfare functions are
E
(
SW II1 (S, T )
)
=
101
294b
(a− c)
2
+
3
8b
σ2, (32)
E
(
SW II2 (S, T )
)
=
449
882b
(a− c)
2
. (33)
One can easily verify that the expected social welfare for the domestic country increases with
market volatility. This together with the findings for (T, S) yield the following proposition:
Proposition 3. For mixed game (either (T,S) or (S,T)) with incomplete information,
i. the entire option value shifts to the domestic country due to incomplete information;
ii. social welfare for the domestic country increases as variance increases.
4 Choice of Regimes
Given that we have derived sub-game equilibrium points for trade game with incomplete information
and trade game with complete information (see Appendices A to D), we are now ready to investigate
what governments would do in order maximize their social welfare in stage one. This can be modeled
as two strategic games.
To this end, we construct two strategic games that involve choosing policy regimes by two gov-
ernments simultaneously in the first stage. We denote G1 and G2 as the choice of policy games with
expected payoffs derived under incomplete information and under complete information (see Appen-
dices), respectively. For both games:
i. the set of players are government 1 and 2;
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ii. the set of actions are {S, T};
iii. the payoffs are in terms of expected social welfare;
iv. the preference relations of governments are over expected social welfare.
Table 1 and 2 illustrate the normal form representation of game G1 and G2, respectively. Govern-
ment 1 is the row player and government 2 is the column player in both games.
Table 1: Normal form representation of game G1
Government 2
Government 1 Subsidy Tariff
Subsidy E
(
SW II1 (S, S)
)
, E
(
SW II2 (S, S)
)
E
(
SW II1 (S, T )
)
, E
(
SW II2 (S, T )
)
Tariff E
(
SW II1 (T, S)
)
, E
(
SW II2 (T, S)
)
E
(
SW II1 (T, T )
)
, E
(
SW II2 (T, T )
)
Table 2: Normal form representation of game G2
Government 2
Government 1 Subsidy Tariff
Subsidy E
(
SWCI1 (S, S)
)
, E
(
SWCI2 (S, S)
)
E
(
SWCI1 (S, T )
)
, E
(
SWCI2 (S, T )
)
Tariff E
(
SWCI1 (T, S)
)
, E
(
SWCI2 (T, S)
)
E
(
SWCI1 (T, T )
)
, E
(
SWCI2 (T, T )
)
We are now ready to conduct equilibrium analysis of these two games using conventional Nash
solution concept. Our presentation here follows rationalizability concept proposed by Pearce (1984).
Let us first consider the game G1. Assuming that government 2 chooses subsidy to begin with, the
best response for government 1 is to choose tariff since E
(
SW II1 (T, S)
)
− E
(
SW II1 (S, S)
)
> 0. On
the other hand, given that government 2 chooses tariff, the best response for government 1 is to choose
tariff as well since E
(
SW II1 (T, T )
)
− E
(
SW II1 (S, T )
)
> 0. Both best responses from government 1
is independent of market volatility, and government 1 strictly prefers to impose tariff on imports from
firm 2 no matter which trade policy government 2 prescribed. Therefore, subsidy is strictly dominated
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by tariff from government 1’s perspective. After strategy subsidy is eliminated by government 1, tariff
is also a best response from government 2’s point of view. As a result, (T, T ) is the only pair of strategy
that survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominant strategy. Hence (T, T ) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of G1. This gives us
Proposition 4. The unique Nash equilibrium of game G1 is (T, T ), regardless of market volatility.
The similar argument and reasoning from rationalizability can also be applied to G2, yielding
Proposition 5. The unique Nash equilibrium of game G2 is (T, T ), regardless of market volatility.
This is not surprising since game G1 and G2 are actually variants of classical prisoner’s dilemma
game. Although the pair of strategy (S, S) gives better payoffs to both governments than the payoffs
from (T, T ), (S, S) is never achievable as long as we do not allow the governments to cooperate. Our
result is consistent with the conventional wisdom that a Cournot-Nash game played by governments
and firms will lead them to choose a tariff in equilibrium with certainty.
It is worth noting that the unique Nash equilibrium is independent of variance. This is because
the option value associated with better information is the same under all pairs of strategies chosen by
governments. For example, the option value to the domestic country is 38bσ
2 for all pair of strategies
with incomplete information. Therefore, the market volatility plays no role in determining optimal
strategy in choosing between subsidy and tariff. This results is in sharp contrast to Anam and Chiang
(2018) in that the choice of trade policy game is shown to depend on the correlation between two mar-
kets. This is not the case in the current paper because we assume that two markets are stochastically
independent. Moreover, our results are also different from Cooper and Riezman (1989) in that the
choice is shown to depend on the degree of uncertainty. While their model assumes that the infor-
mation about market demand is symmetrically revealed to both firms, we here focus on the effect of
information asymmetry on the choice of trade policies.
Notice that although incomplete information for the foreign firm does not affect the optimal strate-
gic choice between tariff and subsidy, it, nevertheless, redistributes the option value associated with
better information. As shown in trade game with incomplete information, the well-informed domestic
firm is able to capture entire option value, since it is able to make output decision after the resolution
of uncertainty.
Because Nash equilibrium (T, T ) implies a prisoner’s dilemma outcome, we shall consider a special
case which both governments agree on free-trade agreement. Then we compare these social welfare
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levels from free-trade to our Nash equilibrium output to determine which trade policy (tariff or free-
trade agreement) is optimal.
5 Free-Trade with Incomplete Information
In this section, we show that no intervention is superior to the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (T, T ). To
see this, first consider the domestic firm’s maximization problem:
max
qII
1L
,xII
1
piII1L =
(
a− b
(
qII1L + x
II
2
)
− V
)
qII1L +
(
a− b
(
qII2 + x
II
1
))
xII1 − c
(
qII1L + x
II
1
)
, (34)
if ε = −V ;
max
qII
1H
,xII
1
piII1H =
(
a− b
(
qII1H + x
II
2
)
+ V
)
qII1H +
(
a− b
(
qII2 + x
II
1
))
xII1 − c
(
qII1H + x
II
1
)
, (35)
if ε = V . The foreign firm, being ill-informed, solves the following maximization problem given common
prior:
max
qII
2
,xII
2
E
(
piII2
)
=
(
a− b
(
qII2 + x
II
1
))
qII2 +
1
2
∑
ε∈Ω
(
a− b
(
qII1 + x
II
2
)
+ ε
)
xII2 − c
(
qII2 + x
II
2
)
, (36)
where qII1 ∈
{
qII1L, q
II
1H
}
depend on the realization of ε.
The best response functions for above problems are
BR1L = q
II
1L ∈ argmaxpi
II
1L,
BR1H = q
II
1H ∈ argmaxpi
II
1H ,
BR1x = x
II
1 ∈ argmaxpi
II
1L,
BR2 = q
II
2 ∈ argmaxpi
II
2 ,
BR2x = x
II
2 ∈ argmaxpi
II
2 .
21
Solving yields
qII1L =
1
3b
(a− c)−
1
2b
V,
qII1H =
1
3b
(a− c) +
1
2b
V,
xII1 =
1
3b
(a− c) ,
qII2 =
1
3b
(a− c) ,
xII2 =
1
3b
(a− c) .
By substitution, one obtains the expected social welfare functions for home and foreign countries,
respectively.
E
(
SW II1
)
= PSII1 + CS
II
1
=
1
2
(
piII1L + pi
II
1H
)
+
1
2
(
b
2
(
qII1L + x
II
2
)2
+
b
2
(
qCI1H + x
II
2
)2)
=
4
9b
(a− c)
2
+
3
8b
σ2, (37)
E
(
SW II2
)
= PSII2 + CS
II
2
= piII2 +
b
2
(qII2 + x
II
1 )
2
=
4
9b
(a− c)
2
. (38)
It follows that
E
(
SW II1
)
− E
(
SW II1 (T, T )
)
> 0,
E
(
SW II2
)
− E
(
SW II2 (T, T )
)
> 0.
The result is summarized in
Proposition 6. With incomplete information at industrial level, Nash equilibrium outcome for game
G1, (T,T), is inferior to free-trade outcome for both countries.
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6 Conclusion
The main focus of this paper is to reexamine the strategic trade policy in the context of reciprocal
markets under incomplete information, an issue that has been ignored in the literature. Several
departures from conventional strategic trade policy wisdom are observed. First, an export subsidy
is superior to a tariff if one country is active and can unilaterally choose a trade policy against its rival.
But interestingly, tariffs turn out to be a non-cooperative equilibrium outcome when both governments
are active and set trade policies against each other. The result holds regardless of market volatility
and information partition. Incomplete information for the foreign firm redistributes the option value,
associated with ability to make decision after the resolution of uncertainty, to the country with more
information. Second, we show that the Nash equilibrium outcome under incomplete information (i.e.,
(T, T )) is inferior to the equilibrium outcome absent of any form of government intervention (i.e.,
Laissez-faire).
The paper adopts some simplified assumptions to highlight our assertions. These include a trade
game being simultaneous-move, policy modes being restricted to tariffs and export subsidies, marginal
costs being constant, and the random disturbance being additive in form. A natural extension of
current model would be to expand policy set to include quota as well as a sequential game structure.
Therefore, the countervailing policy model can be revisited to take into account the possibility that one
country proactively intervenes by adopting a strategic trade policy while the other responds optimally
by retaliating with appropriate instruments in response to the leader’s choice. The equilibrium choice
of the leader government would then be determined by backward induction as usual. It is possible
that equilibrium response to a subsidy may be something other than a countervailing duty. But we
leave it for future research.
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Appendices
In this Appendix, we derive the equilibrium outputs, subsidies/tariffs, and policy regimes in stage
three for trade game with complete information under various trade policies. As in the main text, the
actions taken by various decision makers are summarized in the following figure:
Figure 2: Timing of Three-Stage Trade Game with Complete Information
Stage 1 Stage 2 Beginning of Stage 3 Stage 3
Both governments Both governments Both Firms
select → select → firms → play
policy modes policy levels observe ε Cournot game
Four policy combinations, (S, S), (T, T ), (T, S) and (S, T ), under complete information are exam-
ined in sequence.
A Subsidy Game (S,S)
We first consider the game, where export subsidy is committed to by both governments, as the policy
instrument in stage one. Under complete information assumption, the solution through backward
induction starts in stage three when the random variable ε is known to both domestic and foreign
firms.
Starting from the last stage, if the true market condition is −V in country 1, each firm’s problem
is
max
qCI
1L
(S,S),xCI
1
(S,S)
piCI1L (S, S) =
(
a− b
(
qCI1L (S, S) + x
CI
2L (S, S)
)
− V
)
qCI1L (S, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qCI1 (S, S) + x
CI
1 (S, S)
))
xCI1 (S, S)
− c
(
qCI1L (S, S) + x
CI
1 (S, S)
)
+ s1x
CI
1 (S, S) , (39)
max
qCI
2
(S,S),xCI
2L
(S,S)
piCI2L (S, S) =
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (S, S) + x
CI
1 (S, S)
))
qCI2 (S, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qCI1L (S, S) + x
CI
2L (S, S)
)
− V
)
xCI2L (S, S)
− c
(
qCI2 (S, S) + x
CI
2L (S, S)
)
+ s2x
CI
2L (S, S) . (40)
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Similarly, if the true market demand is high in country 1, each firm’s problem can be written as
max
qCI
1H
(S,S),xCI
1
(S,S)
piCI1H (S, S) =
(
a− b
(
qCI1H (S, S) + x
CI
2H (S, S)
)
+ V
)
qCI1H (S, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (S, S) + x
CI
1 (S, S)
))
xCI1 (S, S)
− c
(
qCI1H (S, S) + x
CI
1 (S, S)
)
+ s1x
CI
1 (S, S) , (41)
max
qCI
2
(S,S),xCI
2H
(S,S)
piCI2H (S, S) =
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (S, S) + x
CI
1 (S, S)
))
qCI2 (S, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qCI1H (S, S) + x
CI
2H (S, S)
)
+ V
)
xCI2H (S, S)
− c
(
qCI2 (S, S) + x
CI
2H (S, S)
)
+ s2x
CI
2H (S, S) , (42)
where si is the subsidy per unit of export for i = 1, 2, and the subscript L and H stands for the variable
choice for each firm in the respective states8. The best response functions for the above maximization
problems are
BR1L = q
CI
1L (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1L (S, S) ,
BR1H = q
CI
1H (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1H (S, S) ,
BR1x = x
CI
1 (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1L (S, S) ,
BR2 = q
CI
2 (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2L (S, S) ,
BR2xL = x
CI
2L (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2L (S, S) ,
BR2xH = x
CI
2H (S, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2H (S, S) .
Given these best response functions, we can obtain the Nash equilibrium points in each state for
8Henceforth, we use subscript L to represent variable choice when the random variable is −V , and we use subscript
H to represent variable choice when the random variable is V .
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any given level of s1 and s2 as follows:
qCI1L (S, S) =
1
3b
(a− c− V − s2) ,
qCI1H (S, S) =
1
3b
(a− c+ V − s2) ,
xCI1 (S, S) =
1
3b
(a− c+ 2s1) ,
qCI2 (S, S) =
1
3b
(a− c− s1) ,
xCI2L (S, S) =
1
3b
(a− c− V + 2s2) ,
xCI2H (S, S) =
1
3b
(a− c+ V + 2s2) .
The solutions characterize the Nash equilibrium in each market given (s1, s2, V ).
Folding back to the second stage, both governments set subsidy rates to maximize respective social
welfare given that they anticipate the Nash equilibrium output levels in stage three across different
states of nature. The social welfare functions for both governments under export subsidy are specified
as the sum of producer’s surplus and consumer’s surplus net of total subsidy. Hence, the problem for
each government can be written as
max
s1
E
(
SWCI1 (S, S)
)
= PSCI1 (S, S) + CS
CI
1 (S, S)− S
CI
1 (S, S)
=
1
2
(
piCI1L (S, S) + pi
CI
1H (S, S)
)
+
1
2
(
b
2
(
qCI1L (S, S) + x
CI
2L (S, S)
)2
+
b
2
(
qCI1H (S, S) + x
CI
2H (S, S)
)2)
− s1x
CI
1 (S, S) , (43)
max
s2
E
(
SWCI2 (S, S)
)
= PSCI2 (S, S) + CS
CI
2 (S, S)− S
CI
2 (S, S)
=
1
2
(
piCI2L (S, S) + pi
CI
2H (S, S)
)
+
b
2
(qCI2 (S, S) + x
CI
1 (S, S))
2
−
1
2
(
xCI2L (S, S) + x
CI
2H (S, S)
)
s2. (44)
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The best response functions of stage two game are
BR1 (s2) = s1 ∈ argmaxE
(
SWCI1 (S, S)
)
,
BR2 (s1) = s2 ∈ argmaxE
(
SWCI2 (S, S)
)
.
Solving yields Bayesian Nash equilibrium level of export subsidies
s∗1 = s
∗
2 =
1
4
(a− c) . (45)
By Substitution, one can obtain the expected output levels for each firm in stage three as follows:
E
(
qCI1L (S, S)
)
=
1
4b
(a− c)−
1
3b
V,
E
(
qCI1H (S, S)
)
=
1
4b
(a− c) +
1
3b
V,
E
(
xCI1 (S, S)
)
=
1
2b
(a− c) ,
E
(
qCI2 (S, S)
)
=
1
4b
(a− c) ,
E
(
xCI2L (S, S)
)
=
1
2b
(a− c)−
1
3b
V,
E
(
xCI2H (S, S)
)
=
1
2b
(a− c) +
1
3b
V.
Given equation (45), the expected social welfare for both countries are
E
(
SWCI1 (S, S)
)
=
15
32b
(a− c)
2
+
1
3b
σ2, (46)
E
(
SWCI2 (S, S)
)
=
15
32b
(a− c)
2
+
1
9b
σ2. (47)
It is straightforward to show that
∂E(SWCIi (S,S))
∂σ2
> 0 for i = 1, 2. That is, the expected so-
cial welfare increases with market volatility. Notice that the second term in expected social welfare
functions is the option value associated with better information. Apparently, E
(
SWCI1 (S, S)
)
−
E
(
SWCI2 (S, S)
)
> 0, indicating that the domestic country enjoys higher option values than the
foreign country.
Next, we turn to examine the sub game equilibrium under tariff game.
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B Tariff Game (T,T)
We now turn to the tariff game between the two countries. Similar to the equilibrium analysis in the
previous section, we start from the last stage in which both firms observe the true market condition
in country 1.
If the true market demand in country 1 is low, we can write firms’ problems as
max
qCI
1L
(T,T ),xCI
1
(T,T )
piCI1L (T, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qCI1L (T, T ) + x
CI
2L (T, T )
)
− V
)
qCI1L (T, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (T, T ) + x
CI
1 (T, T )
))
xCI1 (T, T )
− c
(
qCI1L (T, T ) + x
CI
1 (T, T )
)
− t2x
CI
1 (T, T ) , (48)
max
qCI
2
(T,T ),xCI
2L
(T,T )
piCI2L (T, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (T, T ) + x
CI
1 (T, T )
))
qCI2 (T, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qCI1L (T, T ) + x
CI
2L (T, T )
)
− V
)
xCI2L (T, T )
− c
(
qCI2 (T, T ) + x
CI
2L (T, T )
)
− t1x
CI
2L (T, T ) . (49)
On the other hand, if the true market demand in country 1 is high, the profit functions for both
firms are
max
qCI
1H
(T,T ),xCI
1
(T,T )
piCI1H (T, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qCI1H (T, T ) + x
CI
2H (T, T )
)
+ V
)
qCI1H (T, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (T, T ) + x
CI
1 (T, T )
))
xCI1 (T, T )
− c
(
qCI1H (T, T ) + x
CI
1 (T, T )
)
− t2x
CI
1 (T, T ) , (50)
max
qCI
2
(T,T ),xCI
2H
(T,T )
piCI2H (T, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (T, T ) + x
CI
1 (T, T )
))
qCI2 (T, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qCI1H (T, T ) + x
CI
2H (T, T )
)
+ V
)
xCI2H (T, T )
− c
(
qCI2 (T, T ) + x
CI
2H (T, T )
)
− t1x
CI
2H (T, T ) , (51)
where ti is the tariff imposed by the home government on foreign imports for i = 1, 2. The best
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response functions for above problems are
BR1L = q
CI
1L (T, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1L (T, T ) ,
BR1H = q
CI
1H (T, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1H (T, T ) ,
BR1x = x
CI
1 (T, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1L (T, T ) ,
BR2 = q
CI
2 (T, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2L (T, T ) ,
BR2xL = x
CI
2L (T, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2L (T, T ) ,
BR2xH = x
CI
2H (T, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2H (T, T ) .
Given these best response functions, the Nash equilibrium output levels given any (t1, t2, V ) for
stage three game are
qCI1L (T, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c− V + t1) ,
qCI1H (T, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c+ V + t1) ,
xCI1 (T, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c− 2t2) ,
qCI2 (T, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c+ t2) ,
xCI2L (T, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c− V − 2t1) ,
xCI2H (T, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c+ V − 2t1) .
Moving backward to the second stage, each government selects the tariff rate to maximize its
social welfare given that each government anticipates Nash equilibrium outputs from both firms in
stage three. The maximization problem facing each government under tariffs is the sum of producer’s
surplus, consumer’s surplus and tariff revenue, given by
max
t1
E
(
SWCI1 (T, T )
)
= PSCI1 (T, T ) + CS
CI
1 (T, T ) + TR
CI
1 (T, T )
=
1
2
(
piCI1L (T, T ) + pi
CI
1H (T, T )
)
+
1
2
(
b
2
(
qCI1L (T, T ) + x
CI
2L (T, T )
)2
+
b
2
(
qCI1H (T, T ) + x
CI
2H (T, T )
)2)
+
1
2
t1
(
xCI2L (T, T ) + x
CI
2H (T, T )
)
, (52)
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max
t2
E
(
SWCI2 (T, T )
)
= PSCI2 (T, T ) + CS
CI
2 (T, T )− TR
CI
2 (T, T )
=
1
2
(
piCI2L (T, T ) + pi
CI
2H (T, T )
)
+
b
2
(qCI2 (T, T ) + x
CI
1 (T, T ))
2
+ t2x
CI
1 (T, T ) . (53)
The best response functions of stage two game are
BR1 (t2) = t1 ∈ argmaxE
(
SWCI1 (T, T )
)
,
BR2 (t1) = t2 ∈ argmaxE
(
SWCI2 (T, T )
)
.
Solving yields Bayesian Nash equilibrium level of tariff
t∗1 = t
∗
2 =
1
3
(a− c) . (54)
It is worth noting that both governments impose same amount of tariff rate since there is no
information advantage of one country over another country at national level. Substituting the optimal
tariff rate in equation (54) into best response functions of both firms, we can get the expected output
in stage three as
E
(
qCI1L (T, T )
)
=
4
9b
(a− c)−
1
3b
V,
E
(
qCI1H (T, T )
)
=
4
9b
(a− c) +
1
3b
V,
E
(
xCI1 (T, T )
)
=
1
9b
(a− c) ,
E
(
qCI2 (T, T )
)
=
4
9b
(a− c) ,
E
(
xCI2L (T, T )
)
=
1
9b
(a− c)−
1
3b
V,
E
(
xCI2H (T, T )
)
=
1
9b
(a− c) +
1
3b
V.
Given these, the expected social welfare for both countries can then be written as
E
(
SWCI1 (T, T )
)
=
65
162b
(a− c)
2
+
1
3b
σ2, (55)
E
(
SWCI2 (T, T )
)
=
65
162b
(a− c)
2
+
1
9b
σ2. (56)
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Hence,
∂E(SWCIi (T,T ))
∂σ2
> 0 for i = 1, 2. This implies that higher market volatility, both at home
and abroad, enhances the expected social welfare. The stochastic term represents the gain in social
welfare associated with the option value accruing to firms from being able to wait for the resolution
of uncertainty. It is also worth noting that the domestic country ends up with higher expected social
welfare due to higher option value effects.
Next, we turn to examine the mixed game, either (T, S) or (S, T ), under complete information in
the next two sub-sections.
C Mixed Game (T,S)
We now turn to a scenario where country 1 imposes a tariff on firm 2’s export, while country 2 subsidizes
its exports. As above, the three-stage game is solved by the backward induction, beginning with the
last stage.
In stage three, both firms observe the random variable ε before making their output decisions. If
ε = −V , their problems can be written as
max
qCI
1L
(T,S),xCI
1
(T,S)
piCI1L (T, S) =
(
a− b
(
qCI1L (T, S) + x
CI
2L (T, S)
)
− V
)
qCI1L (T, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (T, S) + x
CI
1 (T, S)
))
xCI1 (T, S)
− c
(
qCI1L (T, S) + x
CI
1 (T, S)
)
, (57)
max
qCI
2
(T,S),xCI
2L
(T,S)
piCI2L (T, S) =
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (T, S) + x
CI
1 (T, S)
))
qCI2 (T, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qCI1L (T, S) + x
CI
2L (T, S)
)
− V
)
xCI2L (T, S)
− c
(
qCI2 (T, S) + x
CI
2L (T, S)
)
+ s2x
CI
2L (T, S)− t1x
CI
2L (T, S) . (58)
Conversely, if ε = V , firms make
max
qCI
1H
(T,S),xCI
1
(T,S)
piCI1H (T, S) =
(
a− b
(
qCI1H (T, S) + x
CI
2H (T, S)
)
+ V
)
qCI1H (T, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (T, S) + x
CI
1 (T, S)
))
xCI1 (T, S)
− c
(
qCI1H (T, S) + x
CI
1 (T, S)
)
, (59)
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max
qCI
2
(T,S),xCI
2H
(T,S)
piCI2H (T, S) =
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (T, S) + x
CI
1 (T, S)
))
qCI2 (T, S)
+
(
a− b
(
qCI1H (T, S) + x
CI
2H (T, S)
)
+ V
)
xCI2H (T, S)
− c
(
qCI2 (T, S) + x
CI
2H (T, S)
)
+ s2x
CI
2H (T, S)− t1x
CI
2H (T, S) , (60)
where t1 is the tariff imposed by the domestic government on the imports from the foreign firm, and
s2 is the export subsidy granted by the foreign government to its own firm’s export to market 1. The
corresponding best response functions for the above maximization problems are
BR1L = q
CI
1L (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1L (T, S) ,
BR1H = q
CI
1H (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1H (T, S) ,
BR1x = x
CI
1 (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1L (T, S) ,
BR2 = q
CI
2 (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2L (T, S) ,
BR2xL = x
CI
2L (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2L (T, S) ,
BR2xH = x
CI
2H (T, S) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2H (T, S) .
Given these best response functions, the Nash equilibrium outputs given (t1, s2, V ) for stage three
game are
qCI1L (T, S) =
1
3b
(a− c− V − s2 + t1) ,
qCI1H (T, S) =
1
3b
(a− c+ V − s2 + t1) ,
xCI1 (T, S) =
1
3b
(a− c) ,
qCI2 (T, S) =
1
3b
(a− c) ,
xCI2L (T, S) =
1
3b
(a− c− V + 2s2 − 2t1) ,
xCI2H (T, S) =
1
3b
(a− c+ V + 2s2 − 2t1) .
In stage two, the expected social welfare for the domestic country is the sum of producer’s surplus,
consumer’s surplus and tariff revenue, while the expected social welfare for the foreign country is the
sum of producer’s surplus and consumer’s surplus net of total subsidy. Government 1 chooses t1 and
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government 2 chooses s2 to maximize their expected social welfare:
max
t1
E
(
SWCI2 (T, S)
)
= PSCI1 (T, S) + CS
CI
1 (T, S) + TR
CI
1 (T, S)
=
1
2
(
piCI1L (T, S) + pi
CI
1H (T, S)
)
+
1
2
(
b
2
(
qCI1L (T, S) + x
CI
2L (T, S)
)2
+
b
2
(
qCI1H (T, S) + x
CI
2H (T, S)
)2)
+
1
2
t1
(
xCI2L (T, S) + x
CI
2H (T, S)
)
, (61)
max
s2
E
(
SWCI2 (T, S)
)
= PSCI2 (T, S) + CS
CI
2 (T, S)− S
CI
2 (T, S)
=
1
2
(
piCI2L (T, S) + pi
CI
2H (T, S)
)
+
b
2
(qCI2 (T, S) + x
CI
2 (T, S))
2
−
1
2
(
xCI2L (T, S) + x
CI
2H (T, S)
)
s2. (62)
The best response functions of stage two game are
BR1 (s2) = t1 ∈ argmaxE
(
SWCI1 (T, S)
)
,
BR2 (t1) = s2 ∈ argmaxE
(
SWCI1 (T, S)
)
.
Solving yields
t∗1 =
5
14
(a− c) , (63)
s∗2 =
1
14
(a− c) . (64)
This implies that the optimal tariff imposed by government 1 and the optimal export subsidy set
by government 2 are positive. Moreover, the tariff imposed by government 1 is higher than the export
subsidy granted by government 2. With these optimal policy levels, we can obtain the expected Nash
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equilibrium outputs for both firms:
E
(
qCI1L (T, S)
)
=
3
7b
(a− c)−
1
3b
V,
E
(
qCI1H (T, S)
)
=
3
7b
(a− c) +
1
3b
V,
E
(
xCI1 (T, S)
)
=
1
3b
(a− c) ,
E
(
qCI2 (T, S)
)
=
1
3b
(a− c) ,
E
(
xCI2L (T, S)
)
=
1
7b
(a− c)−
1
3b
V,
E
(
xCI2H (T, S)
)
=
1
7b
(a− c) +
1
3b
V.
Moreover, the expected social welfares for home and foreign countries are given by
E
(
SWCI1 (T, S)
)
=
449
882b
(a− c)
2
+
1
3b
σ2, (65)
E
(
SWCI2 (T, S)
)
=
101
294b
(a− c)
2
+
1
9b
σ2. (66)
It is straightforward to verify that
∂E(SWCIi (T,S))
∂σ2
> 0 for i = 1, 2. That is, social welfare under
mixed policies (T, S) increases with market volatility.
D Mixed Game (S,T)
Finally, we examine the last possible pair of strategies chosen by the governments in stage one under
complete information. That is, country 1 subsidizes its exports to market 2, while country 2 imposes
a tariff on imported goods from firm 1.
If the true state in market 1 is −V , the profit functions for each firm are
max
qCI
1L
(S,T ),xCI
1
(S,T )
piCI1L (S, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qCI1L (S, T ) + x
CI
2L (S, T )
)
− V
)
qCI1L (S, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (S, T ) + x
CI
1 (S, T )
))
xCI1 (S, T )
− c
(
qCI1L (S, T ) + x
CI
1 (S, T )
)
+ s1x
CI
1 (S, T )− t2x
CI
1 (S, T ) , (67)
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max
qCI
2
(S,T ),xCI
2L
(S,T )
piCI2L (S, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (S, T ) + x
CI
1 (S, T )
))
qCI2 (S, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qCI1L (S, T ) + x
CI
2L (S, T )
)
− V
)
xCI2L (S, T )
− c
(
qCI2 (S, T ) + x
CI
2L (S, T )
)
. (68)
On the other hand, if the true state in market 1 is V , the profit functions are
max
qCI
1H
(S,T ),xCI
1
(S,T )
piCI1H (S, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qCI1H (S, T ) + x
CI
2H (S, T )
)
+ V
)
qCI1H (S, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (S, T ) + x
CI
1 (S, T )
))
xCI1 (S, T )
− c
(
qCI1H (S, T ) + x
CI
1 (S, T )
)
+ s1x
CI
1 (S, T )− t2x
CI
1 (S, T ) , (69)
max
qCI
2
(S,T ),xCI
2H
(S,T )
piCI2H (S, T ) =
(
a− b
(
qCI2 (S, T ) + x
CI
1 (S, T )
))
qCI2 (S, T )
+
(
a− b
(
qCI1H (S, T ) + x
CI
2H (S, T )
)
+ V
)
xCI2H (S, T )
− c
(
qCI2 (S, T ) + x
CI
2H (S, T )
)
, (70)
where s1 is the export subsidy granted by government 1 on firm 1’s export to market 2, and t2 is the
tariff rate imposed by government 2 on firm 1’s export to market 2. The best response functions for
above optimization problems are
BR1L = q
CI
1L (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1L (S, T ) ,
BR1H = q
CI
1H (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1H (S, T ) ,
BR1x = x
CI
1 (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
1L (S, T ) ,
BR2 = q
CI
2 (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2L (S, T ) ,
BR2xL = x
CI
2L (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2L (S, T ) ,
BR2xH = x
CI
2H (S, T ) ∈ argmaxpi
CI
2H (S, T ) .
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This gives
qCI1L (S, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c− V ) ,
qCI1H (S, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c+ V ) ,
xCI1 (S, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c+ 2s1 − 2t2) ,
qCI2 (S, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c− s1 + t2) ,
xCI2L (S, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c− V ) ,
xCI2H (S, T ) =
1
3b
(a− c+ V ) .
These are Nash equilibrium outputs across states.
In stage 2, government 1 chooses s1 and government 2 chooses t2 to maximize their expected social
welfare given by
max
s1
E
(
SWCI1 (S, T )
)
= PSCI1 (S, T ) + CS
CI
1 (S, T )− S
CI
1 (S, T )
=
1
2
(
piCI1L (S, T ) + pi
CI
1H (S, T )
)
+
1
2
(
b
2
(
qCI1L (S, T ) + x
CI
2L (S, T )
)2
+
b
2
(
qCI1H (S, T ) + x
CI
2H (S, T )
)2)
− s1x
CI
1 (S, T ) , (71)
max
t2
E
(
SWCI2 (S, T )
)
= PSCI2 (S, T ) + CS
CI
2 (S, T ) + TR
CI
2 (S, T )
=
1
2
(
piCI2L (S, T ) + pi
CI
2H (S, T )
)
+
b
2
(qCI2 (S, T ) + x
CI
1 (S, T ))
2
+ t2x
CI
1 (S, T ) . (72)
The best response functions for stage two game are
BR1 (t2) = s1 ∈ argmaxE
(
SWCI1 (S, T )
)
,
BR2 (s1) = t2 ∈ argmaxE
(
SWCI2 (S, T )
)
.
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Solving gives us Bayesian Nash equilibrium level of policy rate
s∗1 =
1
14
(a− c) , (73)
t∗2 =
5
14
(a− c) . (74)
With no surprise, the optimal policy rates for export subsidy and tariff is identical that under
(T, S). Given s∗1 and t
∗
2, the expected outputs for both firms can be obtained as follows:
E
(
qCI1L (S, T )
)
=
1
3b
(a− c− V ) ,
E
(
qCI1H (S, T )
)
=
1
3b
(a− c+ V ) ,
E
(
xCI1 (S, T )
)
=
1
7b
(a− c) ,
E
(
qCI2 (S, T )
)
=
3
7b
(a− c) ,
E
(
xCI2L (S, T )
)
=
1
3b
(a− c− V ) ,
E
(
xCI2H (S, T )
)
=
1
3b
(a− c+ V ) .
The corresponding social welfares are
E
(
SWCI1 (S, T )
)
=
101
294b
(a− c)
2
+
1
3b
σ2, (75)
E
(
SWCI2 (S, T )
)
=
449
882b
(a− c)
2
+
1
9b
σ2. (76)
Again, we have
∂E(SWCIi (S,T ))
∂σ2
> 0 for i = 1, 2. In other words, social welfare under mixed policies
(S, T ) is also enhanced with higher variance. This together with the sub-game equilibrium analysis
under (T, S), we can conclude that the social welfare increases with market volatility for mixed games
under complete information.
These equilibrium social welfare levels in different sub-games under complete information are used
to construct choice of policy game in section 4.
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